The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place.
Introduction
The German corporate governance system has long been regarded as an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system (Franks and Mayer 1994) . However, this characterization may no longer be appropriate today. Internationalisation is often argued to pressure countries to adopt a 'good' corporate governance system, usually meaning one that follows the capital marketbased Anglo-Saxon model (see Walter 1993) . Indeed, Germany has seen a wave of innovations in corporate governance and the financial system over the last decade. This paper argues, in particular, that the role of the big universal banks in financing and corporate governance has changed substantially in the last years. Often these developments are assumed to shift Germany towards the Anglo-Saxon model. 1 Therefore, our paper concentrates on whether these developments indicate or foreshadow such a paradigm shift in German corporate governance. In earlier work, we have tried to identify an "inner logic" of the German corporate governance system and analysed the development of the German financial system in comparative perspective (see Schmidt/Grohs 2000; Schmidt 2001 Schmidt , 2004 Krahnen/Schmidt 2004) . In the past, we argued that Germany exhibited a surprisingly high degree of stability and resilience to change, thereby suggesting that German corporate governance is still insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented. This paper aims to assess whether recent developments, especially in the banking sector, may have already proved us wrong. Might Germany now be in the middle of a paradigm change?
Our answer is shaped from a systemic perspective, which suggests that corporate governance regimes are "systems" and therefore should be analysed by looking at the complementarity and consistency of their elements. 2 Having this in mind, we argue that the German corporate governance system, in the sense of a consistent configuration of complementary elements, is still an insider control system with a clear stakeholder orientation. In our opinion the changes so far have not challenged the fundamental structure of the German corporate governance. However, important changes in the behaviour of the big German banks have undermined the stability of the traditional German system of corporate governance, raising the question whether this will result in a breakdown of the old system and foreshadow a change to a much more Anglo-Saxon type of model.
German corporate governance up to the 1990s
The German legal framework of stock corporations gives the management board considerable power and the task of managing the company under its own responsibility (see Kübler 1998 ).
This can be interpreted such that not only shareholder interests, but a wider range of interests determine how a large company is to be managed. Management has to act "in the interest of the enterprise." 3 Stakeholder orientation is also a result of the distribution of power in large German corporations. Alongside the strong role of the managing board, strong powers of oversight are vested in the supervisory board. The management board will likely give at least due consideration to the opinions of supervisory board members. However, the power and influence of various stakeholder groups depends very much on the composition of the supervisory board. Almost all large German corporations have one or a few big shareholders, which may be other companies, wealthy families or banks and insurance companies. All large German corporations are subject to mandatory employee codetermination, and almost all of them are heavily dependent on banks as lenders and as active players in corporate governance.
Thus at least three groups are powerful and influential stakeholders -blockholders, employee and/or union representatives, and banks. Typically, each group plays an active role in the supervisory board. Moreover, former top managers of the respective companies occupy an increasing number of seats on supervisory boards. One can consider them as representing current management, at least indirectly. These three or four groups constitute a "governing coalition" in most large German corporations (see Mann 2002 for further details). Small shareholders and institutional investors (those not affiliated with banks) do not play an important role in German supervisory boards, and they are not part of the coalition.
Monitoring and control are made difficult by the fact that the task of managementnamely to act in the best interest of the firm -is not well defined. At the same time, monitoring and control are made easier by the fact that the groups within the governing coalition have quite similar long-term objectives. This objective is clearly not the maximisation of shareholder value, but ensuring stability and growth: banks want their loans to be secure; employees and unions want job security, promotion opportunities for staff and the protection of the human capital; family blockholders want the family name and family involvement to last; top managers of other firms want stable economic structures in Germany;
and ex-top managers want to protect their peers who are in charge. The common interest of the powerful groups may amount to what some legal scholars call "the interest of the enterprise." Already this brief and idealised description of German corporate governance provides a clear picture of its fundamental nature or its "inner logic" up to the 1990s (see Figure 1 ).
German corporate governance has a clear stakeholder orientation as opposed to a one-sided shareholder orientation. It is an insider control system as opposed to an outsider control system. It functions on the basis of internal information as opposed to public information. No active public takeover market acts as a market for corporate control. In Germany, the market for corporate control has been more modest and limited in the form of a market for blocks of shares. 4 We see these features of the system as being complementary and consistent. One can push this diagnosis much further and compare the ways in which the members of the governing coalition and their respective constituencies participate "in the firm" and its governance. Not market forces and opportunities for "exit" according to Hirschman's (1970) well-known dichotomy, but internal mechanisms or "voice" provide influence and protection for the three groups of active stakeholders. This explains why all groups play an active role in corporate governance.
While we cannot review the various empirical arguments here, Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide performance indicators that suggest it is difficult to assess which type of system is superior in disciplining management and generating financial returns. The concept of complementarity suggests why each of the three stakeholder groups has an observable preference for their specific mode of participation in a firm: the preferences of each group are interrelated. When large shareholders opt for control and banks engage in long-term lending relationships, it becomes easier and more attractive for employees to rely on internal promotion and low-powered financial incentives, as well as to behave as partners in a codetermination regime (see also Aoki 2001, pp.287-291 In Germany, blockholder control, relationship lending and internal labour markets supported by codetermination form a consistent set. These elements mutually reinforce the stakeholder system of governance and internal mechanisms of control based on the private information held by the stakeholders who actively participate in the governance. On a very abstract level, German corporate governance appears rather harmonious. Of course, stakeholder interests may conflict and room exists for these conflicts. But German corporate governance includes mechanisms that preclude the dominance of any specific group interests and reduce the overall level of conflict by assuring that the common interest prevails.
Figure 3: Average Annual Real returns on domestic security portfolios in four countries
This analysis should make clear that banks fulfilled a very important role in the German corporate governance system of the 1990s. Besides being represented on the supervisory board of most large corporations, banks were the main creditors, owned a significant number of large equity stakes and could extend their influence by the so-called depositary voting right ("Depotstimmrecht"). Certainly, banks were central players who ensured the functioning of the system and impeded a change to a capital market-based system.
In the following we will sketch how this role changed in the last few years.
Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance

Legal changes
In this section we briefly present recent legal developments that are relevant for the role of banks in the corporate governance in Germany. The potentially most important -and certainly most topical -recent developments have taken place in the political arena. Four influential groups of high-level experts have recently deliberated basic issues of corporate governance and produced statements as well as corporate governance principles. 5 Our impression is that, all in all, in their widely publicised attempts to address "the corporate governance problem" in Germany, these expert groups agree on a rather simple conclusion:
there does not seem to be a need to modify the basic structure of corporate governance in Germany. Of course, all shareholders should be treated fairly and small shareholders should certainly be treated better than in the past. But none of the expert groups has made an attempt to reinstate shareholders as the supreme authority in corporate governance matters. 6 And none of the groups viewed the role of banks in the German corporate governance as a manner of concern.
In the area of capital market law, substantial changes were initiated. Insider trading was legally prohibited. A federal authority was created to supervise certain elements of the stock market activity in 1994. Mandatory takeover bids were introduced in the new German takeover law of 2002. In combination with institutional improvements at the level of the German stock exchange system, these developments have greatly improved the quality of investor protection. The traditional assessment that the German capital markets are "underdeveloped" does not appear justified any more today. 7 Also the rating of German investor protection by La Porta et al. (1998) does not seem to apply any more. Figure 4 for more details). This fact limits the effectiveness of legally mandated investor protection, 8 and that by itself would make it difficult to interpret the new legal elements as being sufficient to introduce a capital market-based system of corporate governance. (2004) for details underpinning this assessment. 8 A more general criticism of the lacking enforcement is presented in Ehrhardt/Nowak (2002) . For a more general, both theoretically and empirically, analysis of the lack of security law enforcement, see also Bhattacharya/Daouk (2004) A similar conclusion emerges from the German takeover law in 2002. It was enacted immediately after the narrow defeat of the EU takeover directive in the European Parliament in 2001. The German law contains most of the elements of the EU directive, including a mandatory bid rule, but stops short of disallowing all defensive measures. Thus it is also evidence of an attempt to balance improved investor protection with a continuing belief that not only shareholder interests matter.
The law of joint stock corporations has been modified to a considerable extent. The most important part of this modernization process is the "Law for the Strengthening of the proposition that the insider control system is giving way to a market-based system.
All in all, the individual developments observed appear to each be of minor importance. However, taking into account that banks were at the centre of so many of these changes, it is worthwhile to explore in more detail what happened with regard to the banking industry. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1979, 1989, 1999 and 2003 . Percentage values indicate 5-year average market shares regarding total assets, loans to non-banks and deposits from non-banks. In the right panel, the right-hand scale applies to interest margins, non-interest income over assets and cost/income ratios. Pre-tax returns are measured along the scale from 0% to 100% on the left. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (various monthly reports)
Changes in the role of banks in financing and corporate governance
The financing of business
The diminishing role of big banks in German corporate governance
As an overall trend of the last 5-10 years, the big 3 private commercial banks 15 appear to be withdrawing from traditional commercial loan business and attempting to refocus their relationships with large corporations through corporate investment banking activities like underwriting, trading and advisory. 16 In the 1990s, these German banks all acquired investment banks or at least investment bank activities that allowed them to expand aggressively their activities in these directions. For instance, in 1999 the Deutsche Bank ranked first, Dresdner Bank second and Commerzbank fourth among large European universal banks in terms of the proportion of total capital allocated to wholesale and investment banking (Hackenthal 2004, pp.76 ). This trend also shows up in the profit and loss statements of the banks. Especially for the big banks, net interest income declined and the non-interest income over income ratio increased considerably in the 1990s, while loan volume to non-banks decreased (as can be seen from Figure 8a However, blockholders and banks which play an active -and perhaps beneficial -role in corporate governance may require a certain compensation, and this compensation might come in the form of private benefits. More transparency and better investor protection might lead to a reduction of this compensation and ultimately less willingness of those with an active role to continue playing this role. Are there already signs of banks as core players in an insider control system reducing their involvement or their willingness to co-operate in the "governing coalition"?
There are indeed such signs. Deutsche Bank is actively reducing its corporate governance role. It has given up several board seats and has introduced the rule that its own top managers should avoid chairmanships in the board of other corporations. Deutsche Bank has also undertaken several steps to reduce their shareholding and cross-ownerships. As
Deutsche Bank itself hints, one reason for this shift is that the "new" Deutsche Bank simply does not benefit from its traditional governance role. The old role stands in the way of the current strategy.
In the banking sector competition and rivalry have undoubtedly increased. This trend has undermined the old established practice of banks to act in a co-operative manner in governance matters and in the case of financial difficulties of big non-financial enterprises.
The conflicts between the various big banks in the recent Holzmann and Kirch insolvency cases suggest that this traditional model of behaviour is not valid any more, and with it a key element of the old governance system may be about to vanish.
Traditionally, the big banks have been the incarnation of the proverbial "Deutschland AG". The banks (and insurance companies) have indeed been the spider in the web of power and influence in Germany for several decades. However, in functional terms, one can also see their traditional role more positively: Banks seem to have kept the governing coalition stable and working to assure at least a certain level of management control. It remains to be seen what will happen if the big banks should really give this role up as they seem to be doing already.
Conclusion: Assessing recent developments
In conclusion, much has changed which appears to be more or less closely connected to corporate governance in Germany. Especially investor protection and the institutional basis for the control of management have improved considerably. Improvements in investor protection will probably contribute to a (desirable) change in distribution of profits, but not to a system change. More transparency and protection for these investors does not create pressure for management to adjust its strategies. Other factors, like those in the field of corporate law, have not changed so as to reinforce the improvements for small and institutional investors and jointly constitute a radical change of the system.
Moreover, many elements that support the traditional governance system, such as labour law and industrial relations, have remained largely unaltered so far.
Thus, the most important argument against convergence on a capital market-based governance system is the fact that capital markets still do not play an important role in Germany, particularly in corporate governance. In fact, in the last 2-3 years we could even observe a retreat in this respect. For instance, nearly all indicators of German capital market activity, such as stock market capitalisation, IPOs and new equity financing of non-financial companies, show a marked decline. 19 In addition, no signs point to an increasing disciplinary role of the capital markets. However, changing practices of finance and corporate governance indicate that big banks are tending to opt out of the old insider control system. It is an open but extremely important question whether this partial withdrawal of the banks from their former role also reduces the productive relevance of their involvement.
What should be clear is that these developments increase the instability of the German insider control system. The stability of the governing coalition is reduced and this could lead to a fundamental shift of the corporate governance regime in the near future. One possible consequence would be a -hopefully rapid -transition to a -hopefully well functioning -full blown market oriented corporate governance system along Anglo-Saxon lines. But the necessary cond itions for this to happen are not in place and not even in sight.
A more realistic consequence in the medium term is that the effectiveness of the existing governance system will decrease and no new system will replace it any time soon.
As a consequence, a control vacuum could emerge. In fact, today more chairpersons of the supervisory board of large corporations are former CEOs of the same company than ever before and former top managers are systematically replacing bankers as board members.
These facts suggest that the power of management is increasing. One can seriously question whether such a development should be regarded as a move toward good governance. In addition, the growing instability in the German business environment and especially the enormous increase of average top management compensation packages in the past years suggest that we may have already reached a certain control vacuum. Then the old Berle-Means problem reappears in a more up to date outfit.
